THE BALOCH WAR OF 1928 The Pahlavi*(Iranian)-Baloch Military Confrontation Annexation of Balohistan(Westren part).
The anticipated final military showdown between the forces of Reza Shah(King of Iran) and Amir Dost Mahmmad Khan Baloch(Ruler of Westren Balochistan)took place in 1928.General Jahanbani,the commander of the Iranian forces,in his book Amalyyat-e Qushoon Dar Baluchistan(The campaign of Armed Forces in Balochistan),has stated that the decision to invad Balochistan was taken by Reza Shah in 1927,but the military operations were postponed for the following year pending further preparation.Prior to the begining of the conflict,the commanding Iranian general issued a statement in which the Baloch were promised exemption from all previous unpaid taxes and that the taxes collected afterwards would be spent exclusively for the development of their own region for the next ten years,thus hoping to lessen their support for Dost Mahmmad Khan.As to the plight of Amir Dost Mahmmad Khan himself,the statement said that since he had ruled and protected his"ancient cradle", and had faced many difficulties for that sake,"his services would be taken into considreation and his place[position] secured provided that he surrender,and of course,he would be endowed with royal favors as well".(43)
The ruler of Balochistan,however,refused to surrender and replied that "he is not at war with the Iranian government and trust in God" according to General Jahanbani.The auther however,has confirmed that,on the basis of final military intelligence report received by him, the Baloch religious leaders had issued an opinion(fetva) to the effect that "the military forces[of Iran],were infidels and the enemy of the Baloch honor and relegion,thus calling for jihad[holy war]".As a result,the report added,the populace had taken up the call for preparation to jion military actions and"were extremely suspicious of the Armed Forces".(44)
The report underlines not only the extent of the hostile feelings between the two sides,but also underscores the widespread poupler support for the Dost Mahmmad's decision to confront the Iranian forces.
The Iranian forces consisted of three regiments(teep) brought together from the neighboring provinces of Kerman,Khorasan and Sistan and supported by the units of the then small Iranian air force.In addition,they were also assited by a force of 500 Balochi militia(collaborators) from Sarhad.Jahanbani calculated the total Balochi men-at-arms at more than 14,000.of which 5.000 were headed directly by Dost Mahammad's commanders and a little more than 7,500 were to be supplied by other hakoms(tribal chiefs) under his rule upon request.Dost Mahammad Khan had stationed his forces in the forts of the major Balochi town-such as Dizak,Pahra, and Bampur-while the forts of coastal Makuran were protected by the local rulers.(45)
subsequently,General Jahanbani launched his preplanned operation in 1928.Contrery to the anticipation of the Balochi ruler that the main attack would come against Bampur through the classical invasion route from Kerman,the Iranian general directed the thrust of his offensive toward the fort of Dizak boarding Eastren British-held(today's Pakistani occupied)Balochistan,thus utilizing the element of surprise.The main goal of this military move,however,was to prevent Dost Mahammad from receiving any aid from his "brethren" in Eastren Balochistan and Afghanistan,on the one hand, and to cut his escape route to those countries,on the other hand.The general also stated that,prior to the operation, the Iranian government had also secured British cooperation to prevent the Baloch under their control from comong to the aid of their "religious brethren" in Westren Balochistan.Moreover, as one of the main agricultural centers of Balochistan, the heavily defended Dizak region constituted a major base of supply of men and meterial for the Baranzai(Baloch tribe) ruler (Dost Mahammad),thus,capturing it first would have forced the latter to submit much earlier by squeezing his resources.(46)
Nevertheless,the government forces confronted heavy resistance and were forced to advance slowly from fort to fort,suffering heavy casualties.In this regsrd,air power proved effective in reducing the Balochi forts,As a result,the war lasted for seven months before Dost Mahammad was persuaded to surrender with the promise of royal favor.The extent of the intensity of the resistance is best evidenced from the observation of General Jahanbani himself in the battle for the main fort of Dizak:
"(I was amazed by[seeing] how much a smaller force dared to resist the victorious regular force equipped with artillery and machine guns and even not giving any importance to being surrounded and what hope did they have and what feelings to stimulate such a sacrifice in time?
was such a resistance a manifestation of bravery or the result of a deficiency in thought and the lack of awarence sa to the principles of warfare?"
Of course,there were no sacred feelings to encourage such a savage multitude for sacrifices.The few religious declarations by their[religious] leaders had caused them to view the newly arrived armed forces as infidel and had spread the word that their honor and religion would be in danger in the case of victory by the armed forces(Iranian army).
In my opinion, the reason for such resistance with no results and with such a madness,as was being observed, lies in the historival legends,namely, the stories told by the elders of the nation in which the arrival of the Iranian forces in the land of Balochistan was always viewed with a sense of ridicule and described how the Iranian forces had come to this region time after time and in the face of the great and invincible forts left for their country(Balochistan) with heavy losses and athe utmost sense of hoplessness and the small groups which had more courage to remain behind lost thier lives after the arrival of the hot season or evacuated Balochistan upon having been fully humilitated.)"(47)
To Be Countinued
"IRAN AND ITS NATIONALITIES:In The Case Of Baluch Nationalism"
By Dr.Mohmmad Hassan Hosseinbor(page 92-98)
